CORPS OF SIGNALS WAR MEMORIAL AT JABALPUR
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ROLE OF ARMED FORCES IN INDIA'S INDEPENDENCE
READ HOW BRITISHERS DECIDED TO VACATE INDIA IN A HURRY, IT WAS THE ARMED FORCES WHICH COMPELLED THEM TO GRANT INDEPENDENCE AND LEAVE COUNTRY IN A HURRY.
WHY ???
THEY LOST THE LOYALITY OF THE FORCE WHICH THEY ENJOYED IN THE PAST UP TO WORLD WAR - ll
CLICK HERE TO GO TO THE ENTIRE HISTORY
_________________________________________________
WITH NAVAL MUTINY TO HANDLE THE ARMY MUTINITY BY THE SOLDIERS OF SIGNALS TRAINING CENTER REALLY SHOCKED THE BRITISHERS.
In 2007-08, I did a research
project under the aegis of the Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research,
which is part of the United Service Institution of India. At end of the project,
a book titled CONTRIBUTION OF THE ARMED FORCES TO THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT IN INDIA
was published in 2009, by KW Publishers, New Delhi. This covers all the mutinies
in India, starting from the Vellore mutiny of 1806 up to Independence. I am
giving below extracts from chapter 11 (The Soldier’s Contribution to Indian
Independence). References are given in brackets after the relevant
paragraph/sentence. If anyone is interested in reading the entire chapter, you
can see it on my blogveekay's history
book: veekay-militaryhistory.
On 27 March 1946 Sir J.A. Thorne, the Home Member of the Viceroy’s Council, was
asked to prepare a brief appreciation of what would happen if the Cabinet
Mission does not achieve a settlement. One of the important points covered was
the staunchness of the Indian Services if called upon to quell civil
disturbances. According to Thorne’s appreciation, which he submitted on 5 April,
the loyalty of the Services could no longer be taken for granted. In the 1942
disturbances the Services were nearly 100 percent staunch, but this would not be
so on a future occasion. If faced with the prospect of firing on mobs, not all
units could be relied upon. As regards
the behaviour that could be expected of troops generally under these
circumstances, there would be a lot of disaffection, and downright mutiny,
especially in the RIAF, RIN and Signals units. Thorne suggested that an
appreciation on these aspects be prepared by the War Department. (Nicholas
Mansergh and Penderel Moon, (ed.) The Transfer of Power 1942-47(12 vols,
London) vii, p. 150)
The Commander-in-Chief directed the Director of Military Intelligence, Brigadier
B.P.T. O’Brien, to assess the present state morale and degree of reliability of
the three Indian fighting services, with special reference to the Indian
Commissioned Officers, from the point of view of their capacity to under three
conditions – in aid of civil power in widespread communal or
ant-present-Government disturbances; in operations on the Frontier; and as
garrisons overseas. The Director of Military Intelligence submitted the Note to
the Commander-in-Chief on 25 April, who expressed his general agreement with its
contents. Extracts from the Note are given below: (Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, (ed.) The Transfer of Power
1942-47(12 vols, London) vii, pp. 406-407.)
(b) The Indian Signal Corps cannot at present be considered reliable….
(e) The Royal Indian Air Force must be regarded as doubtful…
Auchinleck forwarded Brigadier O’Brien’s Note to the Viceroy and the Cabinet Mission, giving copies to Army Commanders as well as the Chiefs of the Royal Indian Navy and the Royal Indian Air Force. As can be imagined, it caused considerable dismay and alarm in all quarters. Meanwhile, the Cabinet Mission requested the Viceroy for an appreciation of the situation that was likely to arise if their proposals fail and for a general policy on India in that event. In a Top Secret Memorandum dated 30 May 1946, Wavell made some interesting observations. The Congress, he felt, was determined to grasp all the power they can as quickly as possible. ‘It is as if a starving prisoner was suddenly offered unlimited quantities of food…his instinct is to seize it all at once … also to eat as much and as quickly as possible, an action which is bound to have ill effects on his health’. As for Mahatma Gandhi, he was ‘a pure political opportunist, and an extremely skilful one, whose guiding principle is to get rid of the hated British influence out of India as soon as possible’. Wavell warned that if the Congress and Muslim League failed to come to terms, serious communal riots may break out, with very little warning, especially in the Punjab and the ‘Mutiny Provinces’ of UP and Bihar. Prompt action would be required to deal with the trouble, with very little time for consultations with London. He suggested that their actions should be based on certain definite principles, the first being to give India self-government as quickly as possible without disorder and chaos breaking out. It was important that Britain should avoid a situation in which she had to withdraw from India under circumstance of ignominy after wide spread riots and attacks on Europeans, or adopt a course that could be treated as a policy of ‘scuttle’ or gave the appearance of weakness. While deciding the short term policy, the long-term strategic interests of Britain should be safeguarded. In the event of serious trouble, there was a military plan, which provided for holding on to the principal ports – Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Karachi – and to Delhi. Subsequently, British troops would be transferred from Southern India to the North. Stressing the need to avoid at all cost being embroiled with both Hindus and Muslims, he suggested a ‘worst case’ solution – to hand over the Hindu Provinces to the Congress and withdraw to the Muslim Provinces the North-West and North-East. (Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, (ed.) The Transfer of Power 1942-47(12 vols, London) vii, pp. 731-737.)
Three days later, the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy sent a ‘Most Immediate’ telegram to the Prime Minister, stressing the urgent need for the British Government to announce a clear policy in the event of the negotiations between the Cabinet Mission and the political parties breaking down. They expected the crisis to be reached any time between 5 and 15 June, and the necessity for urgent decision on the line of action that the Viceroy was to adopt. The first point to be decided was whether they should attempt to repress a mass movement sponsored by the Congress and maintain the existing form of government. This was possible only if the Indian Army remained loyal, which was doubtful. It would also cause much bloodshed and achieve nothing, unless it was intended to stay on in India for another 10 to 20 years. At the other extreme was the decision to withdraw from the whole of India as soon as the Congress gave a call for a mass uprising. This would have an adverse impact on British prestige throughout Commonwealth. After considering several options, the Cabinet Mission opined that if negotiations did in fact break down and they were faced with serious internal disorders, the situation would have to be met by adopting one of five courses. These were (1) complete withdrawal from India as soon as possible; (2) withdrawal by a certain date; (3) an appeal to the United Nations Organisation; (4) maintaining overall control throughout India; and (5) giving independence to Southern and Central India, and maintaining the existing position in North-West and North-East India. (Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, (ed.) The Transfer of Power 1942-47(12 vols, London) vii, pp. 787-795.)
The appreciations of the Viceroy and the Cabinet Mission reached London while the latter were still carrying out their negotiations in Delhi and Simla. They were considered by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, which asked the Chiefs of Staff to examine the military implications of the five courses of action listed by the Cabinet Mission, keeping in mind the short-term policy and the long-term strategic interests listed by the Viceroy. The Report of the Chiefs of Staff, which was prepared without consulting General Headquarters India due to the short time available, figure in theDefence Committee Paper D.O. (46) 68 dated 12 June 1946, entitled ‘India – Military Implications of Proposed Courses of Action’. It is a remarkable document, which reveals the difference in the mind sets of ‘imperialists’ in London and the ‘liberals’ in Delhi. It also casts doubts on the intentions of the British Government, regarding granting independence to India.
Right at the beginning, the Chiefs of Staff – Alanbrooke, Cunningham and Tedder – spelt out the strategic requirements of Britain in India in any future war. It was emphasised that Britain should have recourse to India’s industrial and manpower potential, and should be able to use her territory for operational and administrative bases, and air staging posts. It was therefore important that India should be secure from external aggression and internal disorder. For defence purposes, it was essential that she should remain a single unit. These were surprising assertions, considering that even at that moment, the Cabinet Mission was in Delhi, discussing with Indian leaders the form of self-governance that was to be introduced. It was also inconsistent with the Viceroy’s stated views about giving India self-government as quickly as possible.
Before proceeding to examine the military implications of the courses proposed by the Cabinet Mission, the Chiefs of Staff eliminated the first three. The first and second courses that envisaged a complete withdrawal, with or without a time limit, were ruled out since they did not safeguard Britain’s strategic interests. The third course of appealing to the United Nations had the disadvantage of freezing military action while the case was being debated, and was therefore unacceptable. That left only two courses viz. maintaining control throughout India and a withdrawal in phases, which they proceeded to examine. The most important factor in retaining hold over the whole country was the ability to maintain law and order, which depended largely on the loyalty of the Indian armed forces. The conclusions on this crucial aspect were in line with those of General Headquarters India. ‘ ….we consider that the reliability of the Indian Army as a whole, including those in garrisons outside India is open to serious doubt. This applies even to Gurkha units….The Royal Indian Navy and the Royal Indian Air Force cannot be regarded as reliable’.
An important part of the Report deals with the reinforcements required to deal with internal disorders, based on estimates given by the Commander-in-Chief, India. In case the Indian Armed Forces remained loyal, it was estimated that in addition to the existing British forces then in India, reinforcements of three brigade groups and five air transport squadrons would be required. In the event of Indian troops becoming disaffected, the existing British forces and reinforcements mentioned earlier would be employed to hold key areas. To restore the situation in case of widespread disorder, additional reinforcements `required would be between four and five British divisions, for which considerable administrative backing would also be needed. The Indian formations serving overseas would also have to be replaced by British formations. The requirement of reinforcements outside India was visualized as six brigades in Burma and Malaya; two brigades in Hong Kong and Japan; two battalions in the Dodecanese and three battalions in Iraq. The total British reinforcements thus came to five divisions for India; six brigades for Burma and Malaya and three battalions for Iraq.
The Report examined the availability of reinforcements and implications of providing them. There was at that time one British division in the Middle East; two in Greece; one in Italy and one division and seven brigades in Germany. Apart from the fact that pulling them out from these theatres would have serious security implications, it would need at least four months to move all the troops, equipment and vehicles to India, and that too at the expense of merchant shipping and vessels then engaged in carrying personnel home under demobilisation and repatriation programmes. The implications of maintaining the existing units in India up to their present strength would make it necessary to stop release in the formations concerned. In the interest of equality of treatment, it may become necessary to suspend release throughout the army and the other services. These would have a serious effect on morale as well as political repercussions. .
The last course proposed by the Cabinet Mission was granting independence to Hindustan and withdrawing to Pakistan, comprising North-Western and North-Eastern India. This had several political and military implications, the most important being the division of India, which would preclude the establishment of a central authority to deal with defence, and in turn prejudice the future security of India against external attack. The armed forces would have to be reorganized and while India would have a strong army immediately, it would take many years for Pakistan to form an effective army of her own, making her susceptible to raids from the tribes on the North West Frontier. There would be communal riots in the Punjab due to the large Hindu population in the area under British control in Pakistan. In Hindustan, the Muslims may be ill-treated. In the worst case, there may even be civil war, leading to British troops being involved in fighting with Hindustan and controlling communal strife in parts of Pakistan which have Hindu minorities. The Report concluded that withdrawal into Pakistan would not safeguard British strategic interests, could lead to civil wars and in the event that Congress opposed it, even lead to war. Hence, this option was completely unacceptable on military grounds.
The Report ended with the conclusions, which stated:
….A policy of remaining in India and firmly accepting responsibility for law and order would result, if the Indian Army remained loyal, in an acceptable military commitment and would safeguard our long term strategic interests….If however, the Indian Armed Forces did not remain loyal… we would be faced with the necessity of providing five British divisions for India, with the consequent abandonment of commitments in other areas hitherto regarded as inescapable, serious effects on our import and export programmes and world-wide repercussions on the release scheme. The only alternative to this would be ignominious withdrawal from the whole of India. (Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, (ed.) The Transfer of Power 1942-47(12 vols, London) vii, pp. 889-900.)
with regards
Maj Gen VK Singh, veteran
vinay4299@gmail.com
9873494521
The Signals War Memorial in Jabalpur Cantonment is dedicated to the Personnels of Corps of Signals who have laid down their lives in service of the Corps and Country in the pre and post-Independence era including World War I and II. The Signals War Memorial was erected on the Parade Ground of 1 Military Training Regiment of 1 Signal Training Centre, and dedicated to the Nation at a solemn ceremony on February 13, 1961 during the Golden Jubilee Corps Reunion. READ MORE
ALSO - (SCROLL DOWN TO READ ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTION OF SIGNALS IN FREEDOM STRUGGLE)
The walls of the War Memorial list out the names of martyrs in 1947- 48, 1961 (Goa), 1962, 1965, 1971, 1987 (Siachen), 1987-88 (Sri Lanka), 1999 (Kargil), and other operations. The Signals War Memorial has a 305 cms high wall made of Katni stone and a matching base. The column mounts the original Corps Badge (Emblem) of the Indian Signal Corps in brass and Dedicatory Plaque with the inscription 'IN MEMORY OF THE THOSE WHO GAVE THEIR LIVES IN THE SERVICE OF THE COUNTRY'.
As a matter of Corps custom, only white roses are grown and floral tributes of white roses only are paid. In Feb 1970, the current Emblem of the Corps was mounted beneath the old one. This memorial adorns the Parade Ground of 1 Military Training Regiment in Anderson Lines that has, since 1920, been watered by the sweat of the recruits who join the Corps. It is on this Parade Ground, in the shadow of this symbol of supreme sacrifice that they pledge their loyalty to the Service of the Nation. For all these ceremonies, the Roll of Honour is brought ceremoniously and kept at the foot of the War Memorial to enliven the memory of our brethren who have made the supreme sacrifice as their contribution to the Defence of the Country.
The war memorial was renovated in 2006 and inaugurated by the then SO-in-C and Senior Colonel Commandant during the 13th Corps Reunion.
***********************************************************
ROLE OF ARMED FORCES IN INDIA'S INDEPENDENCE
READ HOW BRITISHERS DECIDED TO VACATE INDIA IN A HURRY, IT WAS THE ARMED FORCES WHICH COMPELLED THEM TO GRANT INDEPENDENCE AND LEAVE COUNTRY IN A HURRY.
WHY ???
THEY LOST THE LOYALITY OF THE FORCE WHICH THEY ENJOYED IN THE PAST UP TO WORLD WAR - ll
CLICK HERE TO GO TO THE ENTIRE HISTORY
| CONTRIBUTION OF THE ARMED FORCES TO FREEDOM STRUGGLE OF THE COUNTRY |
_________________________________________________
WITH NAVAL MUTINY TO HANDLE THE ARMY MUTINITY BY THE SOLDIERS OF SIGNALS TRAINING CENTER REALLY SHOCKED THE BRITISHERS.
JABALPUR ARMY SIGNALS MUTINY OF
1946
bY Maj Gen VK Singh,
veteran
I find a lot of articles highlighting the
role of the Naval Mutiny in 1946. Someone even advised Shri Parrikar
and Shri Jaitley to read up everything about the Naval Mutiny in 1946. What
about the Army Mutiny at STC Jabalpur at almost the same time? Unfortunately it
has not been well publicized and most people are unaware of its repercussions.
At that time the Navy was a minuscule force and had almost no role in
maintaining the security of India. But an Army mutiny really shocked the
British.
In 2007-08, I did a research
project under the aegis of the Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research,
which is part of the United Service Institution of India. At end of the project,
a book titled CONTRIBUTION OF THE ARMED FORCES TO THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT IN INDIA
was published in 2009, by KW Publishers, New Delhi. This covers all the mutinies
in India, starting from the Vellore mutiny of 1806 up to Independence. I am
giving below extracts from chapter 11 (The Soldier’s Contribution to Indian
Independence). References are given in brackets after the relevant
paragraph/sentence. If anyone is interested in reading the entire chapter, you
can see it on my blogveekay's history
book: veekay-militaryhistory.
EXTTRACTS FROM CH 11
(The Soldier’s Contribution to Indian
Independence)
The year 1946 opened
with serious cases of disaffection in all three armed services, which have been
described in earlier chapters. In the last week of March the Cabinet Mission,
comprising Sir Stafford Cripps, the President of the Board of Trade; Mr. A.V.
Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty; and Lord Pethick Lawrence, the Secretary
of State, arrived in Delhi, with the task of reaching an agreement with the
principal political parties on two issues: one, the method of framing a
constitution for a self-governing, independent India and two, the setting up of
a new Executive Council of Interim Government that would hold office while the
constitution was being drafted. The Viceroy was fully involved in the
deliberation of the Cabinet Mission, but the problem of the disaffection in the
armed services caused him not a little anxiety. In a dispatch addressed to King
George VI on 22 March 1946, he wrote:
The last three months have been anxious and
depressing. They have been marked by continuous and unbridled abuse of the
Government, of the British, of officials and police, in political speeches, in
practically the whole of the Press, and in the Assembly; by serious rioting in
Bombay; by a mutiny in the RIN, much
indiscipline in the RIAF; some unrest in the Army; by an unprecedented
drought and famine conditions over many parts of India; by threatened strikes on
the Railways, and in the Posts and Telegraphs; by a general sense of insecurity
and lawlessness. …….
The most disturbing feature of all is that unrest is beginning to appear in some units of the Indian Army; so far almost entirely in the technical arms. Auchinleck thinks that the great mass of the Indian Army is still sound, and I believe that this is so. It may not take long, however, to shake their steadiness if the Congress and Muslim League determine to use the whole power of propaganda at their command to do so. (Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, (ed.) The Transfer of Power 1942-47(12 vols, London) vi, pp. 1233-37.)
........We consider that the Indian Services
could not remain in being in the face of communal trouble started by, or turned
into, a Jehad; neither can we suggest any action which might increase the
likelihood of them staying firm under these circumstances.
We consider that the
very great bulk of Indian Armoured Corps, Gunners,
Sappers and Infantry, could be relied on to act in communal trouble not
amounting to a Jehad but would advise
against bringing other services in the Army, the R.I.N. or the R.I.A.F. into
direct contact with rioters.
….Our views on the reliability of the Indian
Services in widespread Congress inspired trouble are
(a) The Indian Armoured Corps, Gunners, Sappers and Infantry can in the main
be depended on provided that their I.C.Os, particularly the senior ones, remain
loyal and any waverers among them are dealt with firmly and
immediately…
(b) The Indian Signal Corps cannot at present be considered reliable….
(c) The Ancillary Services of the Army as a whole
should not be relied on to act against
rioters…
(d) The Royal Indian Navy cannot at
present be regarded as reliable….(e) The Royal Indian Air Force must be regarded as doubtful…
….the key to the reliability of the Services,
particularly the Army, is the attitude of the I.C.O. …the morale of the I.C.O.
can be greatly improved by the example and attitude of British
officers…
Auchinleck forwarded Brigadier O’Brien’s Note to the Viceroy and the Cabinet Mission, giving copies to Army Commanders as well as the Chiefs of the Royal Indian Navy and the Royal Indian Air Force. As can be imagined, it caused considerable dismay and alarm in all quarters. Meanwhile, the Cabinet Mission requested the Viceroy for an appreciation of the situation that was likely to arise if their proposals fail and for a general policy on India in that event. In a Top Secret Memorandum dated 30 May 1946, Wavell made some interesting observations. The Congress, he felt, was determined to grasp all the power they can as quickly as possible. ‘It is as if a starving prisoner was suddenly offered unlimited quantities of food…his instinct is to seize it all at once … also to eat as much and as quickly as possible, an action which is bound to have ill effects on his health’. As for Mahatma Gandhi, he was ‘a pure political opportunist, and an extremely skilful one, whose guiding principle is to get rid of the hated British influence out of India as soon as possible’. Wavell warned that if the Congress and Muslim League failed to come to terms, serious communal riots may break out, with very little warning, especially in the Punjab and the ‘Mutiny Provinces’ of UP and Bihar. Prompt action would be required to deal with the trouble, with very little time for consultations with London. He suggested that their actions should be based on certain definite principles, the first being to give India self-government as quickly as possible without disorder and chaos breaking out. It was important that Britain should avoid a situation in which she had to withdraw from India under circumstance of ignominy after wide spread riots and attacks on Europeans, or adopt a course that could be treated as a policy of ‘scuttle’ or gave the appearance of weakness. While deciding the short term policy, the long-term strategic interests of Britain should be safeguarded. In the event of serious trouble, there was a military plan, which provided for holding on to the principal ports – Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Karachi – and to Delhi. Subsequently, British troops would be transferred from Southern India to the North. Stressing the need to avoid at all cost being embroiled with both Hindus and Muslims, he suggested a ‘worst case’ solution – to hand over the Hindu Provinces to the Congress and withdraw to the Muslim Provinces the North-West and North-East. (Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, (ed.) The Transfer of Power 1942-47(12 vols, London) vii, pp. 731-737.)
Three days later, the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy sent a ‘Most Immediate’ telegram to the Prime Minister, stressing the urgent need for the British Government to announce a clear policy in the event of the negotiations between the Cabinet Mission and the political parties breaking down. They expected the crisis to be reached any time between 5 and 15 June, and the necessity for urgent decision on the line of action that the Viceroy was to adopt. The first point to be decided was whether they should attempt to repress a mass movement sponsored by the Congress and maintain the existing form of government. This was possible only if the Indian Army remained loyal, which was doubtful. It would also cause much bloodshed and achieve nothing, unless it was intended to stay on in India for another 10 to 20 years. At the other extreme was the decision to withdraw from the whole of India as soon as the Congress gave a call for a mass uprising. This would have an adverse impact on British prestige throughout Commonwealth. After considering several options, the Cabinet Mission opined that if negotiations did in fact break down and they were faced with serious internal disorders, the situation would have to be met by adopting one of five courses. These were (1) complete withdrawal from India as soon as possible; (2) withdrawal by a certain date; (3) an appeal to the United Nations Organisation; (4) maintaining overall control throughout India; and (5) giving independence to Southern and Central India, and maintaining the existing position in North-West and North-East India. (Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, (ed.) The Transfer of Power 1942-47(12 vols, London) vii, pp. 787-795.)
The appreciations of the Viceroy and the Cabinet Mission reached London while the latter were still carrying out their negotiations in Delhi and Simla. They were considered by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, which asked the Chiefs of Staff to examine the military implications of the five courses of action listed by the Cabinet Mission, keeping in mind the short-term policy and the long-term strategic interests listed by the Viceroy. The Report of the Chiefs of Staff, which was prepared without consulting General Headquarters India due to the short time available, figure in theDefence Committee Paper D.O. (46) 68 dated 12 June 1946, entitled ‘India – Military Implications of Proposed Courses of Action’. It is a remarkable document, which reveals the difference in the mind sets of ‘imperialists’ in London and the ‘liberals’ in Delhi. It also casts doubts on the intentions of the British Government, regarding granting independence to India.
Right at the beginning, the Chiefs of Staff – Alanbrooke, Cunningham and Tedder – spelt out the strategic requirements of Britain in India in any future war. It was emphasised that Britain should have recourse to India’s industrial and manpower potential, and should be able to use her territory for operational and administrative bases, and air staging posts. It was therefore important that India should be secure from external aggression and internal disorder. For defence purposes, it was essential that she should remain a single unit. These were surprising assertions, considering that even at that moment, the Cabinet Mission was in Delhi, discussing with Indian leaders the form of self-governance that was to be introduced. It was also inconsistent with the Viceroy’s stated views about giving India self-government as quickly as possible.
Before proceeding to examine the military implications of the courses proposed by the Cabinet Mission, the Chiefs of Staff eliminated the first three. The first and second courses that envisaged a complete withdrawal, with or without a time limit, were ruled out since they did not safeguard Britain’s strategic interests. The third course of appealing to the United Nations had the disadvantage of freezing military action while the case was being debated, and was therefore unacceptable. That left only two courses viz. maintaining control throughout India and a withdrawal in phases, which they proceeded to examine. The most important factor in retaining hold over the whole country was the ability to maintain law and order, which depended largely on the loyalty of the Indian armed forces. The conclusions on this crucial aspect were in line with those of General Headquarters India. ‘ ….we consider that the reliability of the Indian Army as a whole, including those in garrisons outside India is open to serious doubt. This applies even to Gurkha units….The Royal Indian Navy and the Royal Indian Air Force cannot be regarded as reliable’.
An important part of the Report deals with the reinforcements required to deal with internal disorders, based on estimates given by the Commander-in-Chief, India. In case the Indian Armed Forces remained loyal, it was estimated that in addition to the existing British forces then in India, reinforcements of three brigade groups and five air transport squadrons would be required. In the event of Indian troops becoming disaffected, the existing British forces and reinforcements mentioned earlier would be employed to hold key areas. To restore the situation in case of widespread disorder, additional reinforcements `required would be between four and five British divisions, for which considerable administrative backing would also be needed. The Indian formations serving overseas would also have to be replaced by British formations. The requirement of reinforcements outside India was visualized as six brigades in Burma and Malaya; two brigades in Hong Kong and Japan; two battalions in the Dodecanese and three battalions in Iraq. The total British reinforcements thus came to five divisions for India; six brigades for Burma and Malaya and three battalions for Iraq.
The Report examined the availability of reinforcements and implications of providing them. There was at that time one British division in the Middle East; two in Greece; one in Italy and one division and seven brigades in Germany. Apart from the fact that pulling them out from these theatres would have serious security implications, it would need at least four months to move all the troops, equipment and vehicles to India, and that too at the expense of merchant shipping and vessels then engaged in carrying personnel home under demobilisation and repatriation programmes. The implications of maintaining the existing units in India up to their present strength would make it necessary to stop release in the formations concerned. In the interest of equality of treatment, it may become necessary to suspend release throughout the army and the other services. These would have a serious effect on morale as well as political repercussions. .
The last course proposed by the Cabinet Mission was granting independence to Hindustan and withdrawing to Pakistan, comprising North-Western and North-Eastern India. This had several political and military implications, the most important being the division of India, which would preclude the establishment of a central authority to deal with defence, and in turn prejudice the future security of India against external attack. The armed forces would have to be reorganized and while India would have a strong army immediately, it would take many years for Pakistan to form an effective army of her own, making her susceptible to raids from the tribes on the North West Frontier. There would be communal riots in the Punjab due to the large Hindu population in the area under British control in Pakistan. In Hindustan, the Muslims may be ill-treated. In the worst case, there may even be civil war, leading to British troops being involved in fighting with Hindustan and controlling communal strife in parts of Pakistan which have Hindu minorities. The Report concluded that withdrawal into Pakistan would not safeguard British strategic interests, could lead to civil wars and in the event that Congress opposed it, even lead to war. Hence, this option was completely unacceptable on military grounds.
The Report ended with the conclusions, which stated:
….A policy of remaining in India and firmly accepting responsibility for law and order would result, if the Indian Army remained loyal, in an acceptable military commitment and would safeguard our long term strategic interests….If however, the Indian Armed Forces did not remain loyal… we would be faced with the necessity of providing five British divisions for India, with the consequent abandonment of commitments in other areas hitherto regarded as inescapable, serious effects on our import and export programmes and world-wide repercussions on the release scheme. The only alternative to this would be ignominious withdrawal from the whole of India. (Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, (ed.) The Transfer of Power 1942-47(12 vols, London) vii, pp. 889-900.)
with regards
Maj Gen VK Singh, veteran
vinay4299@gmail.com
9873494521
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